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This essay discusses the views of Max Weber and Friedrich Nietzsche
on the questions of religion, science, and the human spirit in the
modern age. The essay drawsfrom Daybreak, Twilightof theIdols,and
The Anti-Christ by Nietzsche, and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism and two other short essays by Weber, cognizant that
relevant passages could be found in other works by both theorists. The
essay seeks also to initiate critical discussion of the above issues within
the social sciences, and calls upon social scientists. particularly
sociologists, to carefully examine these issues. canonical work within
the field, and our interpretations offamous theorists that we generally
takefor granted.
Contemporary social science, and I think sociology in particular, has
neglectedor ignoredNietzsche. In the past,Nietzschewas grossly misinterpreted
by many, including his racist sister, Elizabeth Foerster-Nietzsche, and by Nazi
dogmatists who appropriated bits of his work completelyout of context. These
associations, among others, perhaps account for a lack of interest among
contemporary theorists to properlyunderstand Nietzsche's work.
This is unfortunate,because close readingof theactual text reveals a social .
philosophy absolutely opposed to any totalizing scheme or. ordering of
experienceand knowledge. Likewise,Nietzsche fervently opposesany totalitarian
regime, especially those supported with dogmaticprincipleselevated to religious
status that mystify the world on the basis of abstract faith or exttaworldly 'truth'
or 'diVIne' directives beyond the capability of Jiurfian 'beings; 'Iile# ideology of
Nazi Germany typifies in almost pure form a secular religion constructed on
faith in the mythical 'superhuman' or 'divine' attributes of the leader, who
himselfbattles with the abstract and extraworldly forces of Fate and Destiny (see
Fromm [1941] 1969).
Even a brief reading of virtually any text by Nietzsche reveals a profound
contempt for such forms of social thought and organization, rather than
admiration or support for totalizing ideologies premised on ideational
abstraction, myth, or folklore. In short, Nietzsche detests transcendental ideas
ungrounded in the real workings of the material world, yet which suppose
supersedence over theactivitiesof the here-and-now. On the contrary,he calls for
an experienced-based perspectivethat seeks to uncover subtletyand createclarity
through tireless refinement-- a type of incremental and perspectival knowledge
acquired through methodicaland critical inquiry that forever seeks, that forever
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qu~tions itself and everything else. Nietzsche agrees with Goethe's Faust, that
"es irrt der Mensch, so lang er strebt" (a human being falters, so long as we
struggle) and a.Iso that complacency damns us to stagnation, which opens the
door to oppression,should we ever remark in our quest for knowledge: "verweile
doch, du bist so schoen" (w~it a moment, you are so rapturousj.! The quest for
those ",:ho seek knowledge IS endless and indeterminate; it leads us 10 ultimate
uncertalnty-- the more w~ ~ow, the m?re we don't know-- yet simultaneously
challenges.our ~uman spint to new heights even as we risk 'damnation.' The
ravages of intelligence can bemerciless.
. Unfo.nunately, we.in the social sciences have misread, misinterpreted, or
Simplyfailed t~ r~d Nletz~he carefully, if at all. We have accepted uncritically
somebod>: else s mterpretauon, m~ybe based on somebody else's interpretation,
to the pomt that our understanding amounts to liule more than gossip. In
general, the casual reader lends to notice or thinkabout only the mostoutrageous
statements in Nietzsche(of which thereare many).
.I~ additio? to pwposel~ exaggerated arguments, Nietzsche used various other
stylistical d~vlces to intentionallyconfuse the casual reader, to force interaction
an~ anal~sls ~ather than passive reading and absorption-- as he said, to
philosophizewith a hammer.To this end, Nietzschelook great delight:
Nowadays it is not only my habit, it is also to my taste-- a malicious taste
perhaps?-- no longer to write anything which does not reduce to despair
every sort of man who is 'in a hurry' (Nietzsche 1982: S).
F~ermore, he asks us to d~ the one thing, to extend him the one courtesy
which we have not a~corded .hlm. He asks us to "read well, that is to say, to read
slowly, dee~ly, I~king cautiously before and aft, with reservations,with doors
left ~~n•. WIth delicate eyes and finge~.:. my patient friends..• learn to read me
well. (NIetzsche 1982:5). And yet, this IS exactly what we have not done.
As ~ drawout Nietzsche'sviewson religionand science,and comparethis to
° ~eber, It should become quickly apparent just how poorly we have understood
~ .,-r .. .~~sche.-Howe.ver, ~me serious flawsremain'evenattercarefulteading-cmos;
!, slgn!ficantly:- hIS misogynistic atti~u~e towards women. Although we should
not l~ore hIS absurdly crude and VICIOUS arguments concerning women,and I
definl~ly do ~ot m~e excuses for it, they are not the focus of this paper.
~Ince ~Iologlst.hold Max Weber in much higher regard, I do not think he
r~utre~ an Intr~UClJon like the one I have just delivered to justify a serious
dISCUSSion of Nietzsche: I think the well established 'Weber industry,'as it were,
ren~~rs Weber as a. timeless canon within sociology, and thus always a
legitimate f~us of d~cussion,. though not always an open discussion. I will
d~velop my.l~terprelat1ons of hiS thoughtson religion and science directly from
his o~ wnun.gs~ and generally conclude that we have misregarded Weber as
well: SInce.this IS an essay, I make no claims to a complete and systematic
readingof either theorist,and expect that wecould find relevantpassages in other
works by bothauthors. I seek mainly to inspire critical dialogueon issues that I
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believe stand at the core of social scientific theory and research through a close
readingof particulartexts.
Weber initially creates two polar categories of religions types, or more
specifically, two contrasting natures of religion: asceticism and mysticism. Each
at the core generates a worldview that, because religions practice in general
demands adherence through an abstract leap of faith, premises on omnipotent
deity(ies), and the corresponding futility of human opposition to divine
ordinance. Although both Weber and Nietzsche refer to christianity and other
established religions for examples, they bothdefinereligion generally to include
any set of beliefs organized into a dogmatic and unquestionable system (at least
in its essential legitimacy) predicated on the irrationality of faith, regardlessof
how internally rational the system operates.
Asceticism in general becomes a religion that "operates within the world...
[and] in mastering the world. seeks to tame what is creatural and wicked through
work in worldly vocation" (Weber 1958b: 325). In contrast, mysticistreligions
intend a person to let go of the material world and join in a more ethereal
generality of awareness abstracted completely from the specific realities
encountered in .lived experience. In both cases however, we see a negation of
material reality; in mysticism, one rejects the affairs of life as mundane. In
particularhistorical representations of asceticism.Webernotes that it also rejects
the world, especially in those forms that seek to overcome "creatural wickedness
in the actor's own nature. For then it enhances ihe concentration on the finnly
established God-willed and active redemptory accomplishments to the point of
avoiding any action in the orders of the world" (Weber 1958b: 326). Thus.
Weber recognizes that. despitefoundational differences, religion in practicerends
to converge. wherein the generalcharacteristicsof religious thoughtand practice
is rejection of the real world and its concerns. Morespecifically, religiondenies
the very things most closely associated with material or creatural existence:
sexuality (not to be confused with sex for procreation), sensual pleasures in
general. and most importantly for our discussion» intellectual and scientific
endeavor-- the discovery of human power and potential over and againstdivine
power. As Weber states outright, "there is absolutelyno religion workingas a .
~ .vital force which isnot compelled at some point to demand the credo non quod, .--:
sed quia absurdum--the sacrificeof the intellect" (Weber 1958b: 352).
Religion and science. the latter I will also refer to as intellectuality.
necessarily conflict. because each makes sense of the world in fundamentally
different ways:
Religion claims to offer an intimate stand towards the world by virtue of a
direct grasp of the world's 'meaning'... It claims to unlock the meaning of
the world not by means of the intellect but by virtue of a charisma of
illumination... to those who make use of the respective technique and free
themselves from the misleading and deceptive surrogates... the confined
impressions of the senses and the empty abstractions of the intellect
(Weber 1958b: 352).
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Religion in all cases assumes a divinely ordained order to existence, which
humans can grasp only through religious faith and practice, which eventually at
some point requires a rejection of this world in favor of transcendent and
irrational belief thathinges on faith. God will neverimpart meaning or salvation
to the non-believer. In essence, religion sees the world and its creatures as
imperfect-- less than divine. Whether through ascetic regulation in worldly
action, or mystical abandonment of this world,all religions share the
commonality of other-worldliness, that reliance on human effort alone always
fallsshort and even damns us (a thememaintained by Goethe inEaYsl, although
God intercedes to save Faust), because ultimately it is not ourselves or other
humans we mustplease,but rather a transcendent God in someform,
Nietzsche sees religion as far more malicious towards humanity, and not
just the negation of intellect and reason, but of life itself. Religion does not
merely seek meaning instead of intellectual knowledge, but replaces the
experiences of everyday life withan abstractdoctrinethat dictates behavior and
moral values.Nietzsche firmlydetestsany grand scheme or system of external
control and meaning, which he argues "belies a lack of integrity." Such
abstractly derived beliefs always conflict with real life and fonn the eternal
enemyof intellectual and material based knowledge, which is knowledge derived
from lived experience, interpreted and implemented by the human will to
expression and achievement, The more abstract a religious system, the farther
removed from intellectual endeavor and livedhuman experience it becomes, and
therefore denies everything human: feeling, emotion, sensuality, the will to
meaning, the will to life.
Of thegoalsof religion, specifically the transcendence of thephysical world
into the divine, Nietzsche holdsonly the greatestcontempt "purespirit is pure
stupidity" (Nietzsche 1968: 135),the ultimate ignorance. The physical world is
where we live, and where we must act-- since we are after all human, all too
human. Nietzsche valuesour humanness aboveall, and precisely whatwe might
.consideraweakness, Nietzsche considers our greatest strength in the modem
world.
Feelingand passion, experience and sensation are the essence of Nietzsche's
analysis of modernity. These uniquely human things are not ideals or lofty
virtues, but rather constitute a material core of human existence; with these
attributes, humans become makers of life, of civilization, and develop
understanding of human activity in the world. Modernity for Nietzsche createsa
very complex, if not infinitely complex social system which affords great
opportunity and purpose, a potential for freedom of mind and spirit, yet
simultaneously createsgreatherds of nameless, faceless, passionless peoplewho
lackcreativityand lifeforce, wholack a will to live life rather than just survive
thecontradictory complexities of modernity. In the emergentherdmentality, we
find at the core the comforting belief that "all truth is simple" to which
Nietzsche responds: "is that nota compound lie?"(Nietzsche 1968: 33).
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These compound lies are the ideologies of mass culture, and the
representative institutions that .go~em activitr, r~utinize the e~eryday,. ~nd
separate people from social obligation, In earher u~es, c.onventtonal ~hglon
served this function, but Nietzsche findsall such manifestations contemptible:
I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of
integrity (Nietzsche 1968: 35).
From here then, he launches a scathing ~e(co~s)lructive. atta~k ~n the
representative idolsof modernity, whichculmma~ ~n ,!he Antl-ChrlstWith the
dismantling of the ultimatesystemof control-:~hnsbanlty. . .
The idols of modernity exist as appanuons that represent life, but. In
themselves are not real, nor substitutes, but only an illusionary representation .
systematically endowed as real by human failure .to seize c~ntrol over the
systems of our own creation, whether bureaucratl~, sY?lbohc, cultural.. or
whatever. As we fail to critically challenge conventionality, our c~nvenu~ns
appear separate from us, and in tum rule over us. Th~ id?ls, or ideological
symbols, and the systems of which they are a .face~ instill ~ a preViously
unobtainable degree routineandcomplacenc!.whlch Nle17:Sche l~enbfies as the
greatestbaneof creativity, insight,and the spiritof modernity, which depends on
suchhuman endeavors:
... there is nothing more thoroughly harmful to freedom than ~iberal
institutions. One knows. indeed, what they bring about: they lUldermm«: the
will to power•... they make small. cowardly. ~d s~ug-- i.t is th~ herd anun~
which triumphs with them every time. Liberalism, In plain words, IS
reductio to the herd animal... (Nietzsche 1968: 102).
Nietzsche detestssystemswhichcreate homogeneity.and promoteherd~havior ..
with a corresponding herd conseiousn~s of g~n~ralJ;Zed weakness. futility, ~d
nondescription rather than individualWill to dlsuncllon,purpose,~d meanln~.
The social levelingeffect of the liberal institution2 crushes the spmt even as It
generalizes and distributes (th09g~. ~()~ equally)power~.kn~wledge. an~ energy.
The great innovator, the cultural renegade finds little opportuDity when
bureaucratic institutions are firmly entrenched. . .
The. totality of modem institutional systems and their c~rrespondmg
ideologies of controlbecomea kind of Kaflcaesqu~ nigh~ for~I~he, ~t
bind the individual to society in a stuporousservitude. W~thout JOdlVI~ual ~I
and critical insightcoupledwith an inte~ and sel~~pe~ence~ mtegnt~;
leaders of a system can commit any atrocity and Justify It on the highest, ~
>; most abstract,moral grounds in the absenceof di~~L The ~test ab.straebon! from life, and thus the greatest 'evil,' is Christian doctrine, which here
t .exemplifies Nietzsche's argument:
.~g
.-
H
~;
~1
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...we find that which has been revered as God not godlike, but pitiable,
abs~rd~ h~ful, ~ot ~ercly an error but a crime against life... a religion like
Christianity, which IS at no point in contact with actuality I b 0
• 0 • 0 ,... flng
against the Christian church the most horrible charge any prosecutor has
ever uttered. It ~ left nothing untouched by its depravity, it has made of
e~ery value a disvalue, of every truth a lie, of every kind of integrity a
vileness ~f the soul... of holiness draining away all blood, all love, all
~o~ for life; the Beyond as the will to deny reality of every kind ... against
life Itself... When the natural consequences of an act are no longer 'natural'
but th~~ght of as effected by the conceptual ghosts of superstition, by God,
by spmts, by souls,... then th~ precondition for knowledge has been
de~troyed-- then one has committed the greatest crime against humanity
(NIetzsche 1968: 172. 175, 196)
because h~m~it~ requir~ knowledge to build civilization,to render justice, to
find meaning m life. ldeahs~, ~ described~bove, inverts meaning and values,
and opens the door for exploitation, corruption, and oppression at the hands of
tho~ who control th~ .earthly system built on extra-human or transcendental
beliefs.. ~ore specifically, such systems absolve individual actors of
responsibility, or even classesof people,and reduce humans to mereagents that
serve some extraworldly dir~tive, such as God's will, the need for profit, or
whateverother source of meamng and purposewe worship asdivine.
. We~r arg~es similarly, that People may replace the traditional religious
beliefs With vanous contemporary values,but in so doingmaylikewise deify the
new values. Although, for example, the spirit of modem capitalism for Weber
d~vel~ped from ~rotestant religious teaching, most moderns have lost this
historicalconnecuon, even as they. maintain andaugmentlhe spiritof the belief: .
Any relationship between r~ligious beliefs and conduct is generally
~bs~nt•.. Th~ people filled WIth the spirit of capitalism today tend to be
mdlffere~l, if no! hostile, to the Church. The thought of the pious boredom
of paradise has little attraction for their active natures ..• (Weber 1958a: 70).
• ..~ __ .• • -cr ....". ~ . 1 :~.
Weber ~xpands the .argument to say that since modem society "rests on
m~ha~lca~ foundations" (Weber 1958a: 181-182) of routinization and
!'3l1on~lzatJon, no longer needs the support of religious type beliefs,at least not
In ~he Ideal-type. He anticipates a ki~d of empty functionality, a society in
whl~~ p~ple go ~rough. the mouons, characterized by "mechanized
petriflcation, embellished With a sort of convulsive self-imponance (Weber
195~a: "182) or "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying
n~tll1~g as ShakesIJea:f~ said. T~us both Nietzscheand Weber hold that simple
reJectJ~n of some ~dll1ona1 belief does not necessarily lead to enlightenment.
For N~elZ~he especially, we can dogmatize any of the modem forms of social
org~n~za~on, ~nd thus grant them a religiosity no less transcendental than
christianity, NIetzsche expects the rise of new secular religions of which he
names (vulgar) socialism as an example. '
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Both christianity and socialism create a totalizing ideology and level the
human spiritand willof individual creators to a standardized mediocrity:
when the anarchist... demands with righteous indignation 'his rights,'
'justice: 'equal rights,' he is only acting under the influence of his want of
culture, which prevents his understanding why he is really suffering... 'if I
am canaille, you ought to be so too': on the basis of this logic one makes
revolutions... Whether one attributes one's feeling vile to others or to
oneself-- the socialist does the former, the christian for example the latter--
makes no essential difference... And when the christian condemns,
calumniates, and befouls the world, he does so from the same instinct from
which the socialist worker condemns. calumniates, and befouls society:
even the socialist too anticipates.... even the Beyond-- why a beyond if not
as a means of befouling the Here-and-Now? (Nietzsche 1968: 96-97).
Bothsystemsare schemes designednot to alleviate suffering. but to teachpeople
how to bear the injustice and cultural vacancy of modernity, to exist without
meaning.
Moreover, we havebecome lax and allowed our institutions to rule over us
in reified domination rather than serve us, "having lost all the instincts out of
which institutions grow" (Nietzsche 1968: 103). Implicitly, Nietzsche
emphasizes that the cultureof interaction between human beings (culture) holds
meaning and value in life; the institutions are only functional systems that at
best fulfill the mundane requirements of society, but it is active, vigorous,
thinking people that create meaning. Thus. the institutions of socialism and
christianity fail for the same reason. They both fail in the Here-and-Now, and
become programmatic codes of behavior focused on unreal and transcendental .
events-- the Revolution, or The Last Judgement Yet Ideasalone have no. ,·',1
existence without adherents. and no social significance without material{";,j
implementation. In other words. ideas do not exist separately from thepeopl~..·){:~1
who wield them. ". . :- .- .. >··.~1
The priestly caste as a class of rulers has construcu:<l a fo~ s!'Uct~ of ·.,1
control and rationalization around the fundamental ficuon and uratlOnaltty of . 'i
reIigi()lisoeHef. which wields great power because of its abstraction andr- '.
'beyondness' in the mindsof those lackingexperiential knowledge to deconstru~t .
the 'mysteryof faith.' Nietzscheand Marx(see Marxand Engels 1970)~m 10
accord. in that both developsimilar materialist perspectives that emphasize the
real. corporeal world and actual experience. Religion serves only to perpe~uate
itself and maintain the privileges of the priestlycaste. and may even devise a
'science' to 'investigate' the relationship of religious entitiesto the real world:
In Christianiay neither morality nor religion come into contact. ~th reali!y
at any point. Nothing but imaginary causes (God, so?l. ego. SPl~t. free Will
or unfree will); nothing but imaginary effects (Sin, redemption. gr~~,
forgiveness of sins). A traffic between imaginary beings (God. ~lnt.
souls); an imaginary psychology... (repentance, sting of conSCience,
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t~mptatio~ by the devil, the proximity of God, the last judgement, eternal
bfe) ... (NIetzsche 1968: 135). .
Nietzsche ~~ues th~t religion is not even a dream or an expression of some
humancondilion pro~ected 10~ ultimateconclusion. becausesuch a conclusion
develops!r<?m and mUTO~ reality. Instead. religioncontemplates "a hatredof the
natural... u IS the cxpresson ofa profounddiscontentwith theactual"(Nietzsch
1968: 135). So, Nietzsche concludes that: e
A religion like Christianity•..• which crumbles away as soon as actuality
comes into contact With.it at any point whatsoever. must naturally be am~rtal enemy of the wisdom of the world. that is to say. of science(N ietzsche 1968: 173).
Funhermors, he sees rel~gion in.its routinized form, a mentioned before. as an
lDstru?1e~t o.fcon~~ which a pnestly class wields consciouslyand maliciously
to mamtam us posiuon.
Has the famous story which stands at the beginning of the bible really beenunderstoo~ the s.t0ry of God's abs.olute terr?r of science?.. This priestly
book begins, as IS only proper. With the priest's great difficulty: He hason~y one great danger. consequently God has only one great danger(Nietzsche 1968: 173).
Thatdan~er is worl~ly scientific knowledge derivedfrom livedhuman experience
and applied~cordmg to.human purposesthat demystifiesexistenceand reveals
humanpolenbal.and ~anls~ ~e paralyzingignoranceof religiousdoctrine.
· Once.we recognize rebglOn for what it is. as Weber calls us to do. or
obliterateu f~m all rem.embrance. as Nietzscherages. whereand how then shall
w~ ~enture using our science? Nietzsche seeks to develop the individual human
spmt, freed from ~~ ~~trictions of dogmatic ritual and belief that direct rather~ serve humanmiuauve,subvert rather thanenhance creativityandprogress.
. Nl~tzsche W3?ts a method; he ~oes not seek ~r even expect the posSibility of .
ulbmate. and Immutabl~ truth. Just as Faust discovers. but in essence seeks awa~ o.flife that renewsItselfthrough inqUiry and challenge. through the veryact
of living:
'!Ie ourselves, w~ free spirits, are already a revaluation of all values, an
~camate declaratIon of war... The most valuable insights are the last to be
discovered; .b~t the most valuable insights are methods. All the methods, all
the pre~equlsltes of our present day scientificality have for millennia been
the ~bJects of the profoundest contempt: on their account... one was
considered an e~cmy of God our practices our quiet, cautious, mistrustful
malUler-- all this appeared contemptible to mankind (Nietzsche 1968.
133). .
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In short, Nietzsche calls on each of us to .create meaning, to live as Tennyson
said: To strive, to seek to find, and not 10 yield!
Generally, Nietzsche holds that people suffer in modernity because of a lack
of cultural spirit, of the will to creation, decision, discernment, and
responsibility as a human being, as ~ M~nsch. As he reitera~es ~ver and over, the
systems of modernity hold tt~at which IS~ost. h~fulto life IS~ere C~led tru~,
that which enhances, intensifies, affirms, justifies It and causes It to tnumph IS
called false" (Nietzsche 1968: 130). Institutionalized and total systems, whether
ideational or material, do not promote dissent or critical awareness. Only a
culture of critical awareness, of profound intensity and creative force to challenge
and remake knowledge, to push the boundaries of understanding ?ut~ard can p~ay
this role in society: "Yes to life beyond death and change: ~e hfe ISa c.ollecu.ve
continuation of life ... For the eternal joy in creating to exist, for the will to hfe
eternally to affirm itself' (Nietzsche 1968: 119-1~0) th~re mus~ be hardship.
This opposition does not crush those who dare face It (he IS speaking of cultural
struggle, not of militarism) but rather raises them to new levels: "what does not
kill me makes me stronger" (Nietzsche 1968:33).
I think that ultimately, Nietzsche sees society (at least in some form) as
necessary; he is not an anarchist nor a relativist, but a ~ocial theorist, As he said,
"it is a coIlective continuation of life" in real material terms that we seek, a
social process and method of living unburdened by superstitious belief. Ye~ we
cannot realisucally hope to solve the complex problems of modem society,
especially not with some grand scheme of transcendent salva~onll but we c~
confront our problems with passion and determination, deal With them, and In
the process comprehend and progress in the Here-and-Now. . .
Weber actually draws a similar conclusion, although his audience requires a
different tone, and a perspective more compatible with established int~llectual
and academic practice. He argues that science at all ti~es reveals, Its own
shortcomings; the more we know, the more we reah.ze we don t k~ow.
Knowledge is incremental and never absolute. Webe~ I th..nk also ~~ sCle~ce
primarily as a method, which should never be dogmatized 10.to a religion, which
unfo~una_tely aca~e~ia has already done. In Weber we fmd this:
In science each of us knows that what he has accomplished will be
antiquated 'in ten, twenty. fifly years. This is the fate to which sci~nec: is
subjected; it is the very meaning of scientific work.,., Every scientific
fulfillment raises new questions; it asks to he surpassed and outdated (Weher
1958b: 138).
The pursuit of knowledge does not in itself en~ighten~y.of us, nor~~ it
necessarily impact on our daily lives, because "the Increasing intellectualization
and rationalization do not. .. indicate an increased and general knowledge .of the
conditions under which one lives" (Weber 1958b: 139). The accumulation of
scientific knowledge means instead that one can in modem societ! I~ nearly
anything one desires.and in this capacity lies the potential for Iiberation, but
53
Mid-American Review of Sociology
clearly, such liberation, such freedom through intellectuality is entirely social.
Also, this carries tremendous ramifications that fundamentally change the
meaning of life, and divert humanity away from the mysteries of religion:
...it means that principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that
come into play, ... this means that the world id disenchanted. One need no
longer have recourse to magical means... technical means and calculations
perform the service. ...Now this process of disenchantrnent,... in general
this progress to which science belongs as a link and motive force, do they
have any meaning that go beyond the purely practical and technical? (Weher
1958b: 141).
Weber answers basically 'no.' Above all, science cannot answer the most
important question: "what shall we do, and how shall we live?That science docs
not give an answer to this is indisputable" (Weber 1958b: 143). Science docs
impart clarity, and delineatesvariouselements of existencefrom the gencralisms
of the pre-modem period, but in every instancerequires interpretations such that
adherence to some worldview negates some other position: "you serve this god,
and you offend the other god when you decide to adhere to this position" (Weber
1958b: 151). We can at least remain consistent with our own values, although
science cannot tell us what those values should be, unless we prefer the empty
mechanization of technical proficiency and fail to recognize that "we are all
enriched by the messy reality which is our lot" (Elshtain 1990: 118).
Eventually, we must make decisionsand confront life, drawing on the scientific
"wisdom of the world" available at the moment and cognizant of the risk that
this knowledgeis always incomplete and imperfect,
At this point, only some people will join Nietzscheand the "hyperboreans"
who boldly go where no one has gone before. Weber remains much more
sympathetic to those who stay behind:
To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times... one must say: may he
rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but
simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are open widely and
compassionately for him (Weber 1958b: 155).
For those of us truly modernspirits, "we shall set to workand meet the demands
of the day J in human relations as well as in our vocation." I prefer an attitude
somewhere between Weber's sober practicality and Nietzsche's demanding
exuberance. As e.e. cummings said: "there's a hell of a good universe next door.
let's go!"
ENDNOTES
1. I have translated theGermanmyself. In so doing, I haveadmittedlyremoved
Goethe's sexist language, but retained the spirit of the phrases. There are
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probably better, more poetic translations available, but I think that rfline
express the relevant thoughts. . . .
2. By "liberal," I think Nietzsche means generally the routu~lZed',.bureaucrallC
institutions of modern society. Thus, the contrasting IOfm is not
'conservative' as in the American political sense, but rather social
arrangements thathistorically precede the modembureaucracy, suchas feudal
social contracts.
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